<tit>
RUSSIANS ARE FED UP WITH VARIETY OF PARTIES
<aut>Georgy Ilyichev
<src>Izvestia, January 17, 2006, p. 2
<sum>The Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies reports that most Russians want no more than three political parties in the country while every fifth respondent is convinced that Russia does not need parties at all.</sum>
<cov>Almost 50% of Russians do not welcome a multi-party system
Almost 50% of Russians do not welcome a multi-party system in the country in the 15th year of democracy in Russia. Every fourth respondent longs for the Soviet past, when there was but one political party. Twenty per cent more are convinced that Russia does not need any political parties at all and that distinguished politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky will suffice. The largest group of respondents (practically every third, in fact) will be content with two-three properly organized political parties in Russia.
"Respondents are convinced that existence of a host of small parties only makes the connection between the people and the powers-that-be all the more complicated," Valery Fedorov, General Director of the Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies said. "The picture the people are getting across is not exactly hopeful: the more structures like that there are, the more the noise and commotion there is and the less bona fide is taken."
In the meantime, 37% of respondents would not deprive small political parties of the right to exist. Only 14% are prepared to participate in party work meanwhile, and even less (6%) contemplate joining some political party or other. One per cent of the respondents are ready to subsidize political parties.
<tit>
PAVLOVSKY: POWER VERTICAL IS NOTHING WITHOUT MONEY<aut>Yelena Mayakova
<src>Versiya, No 2 (27), January 16 - 22, 2006, p. 8
<sum>An interview with Effective Politics Foundation President Gleb Pavlovsky.</sum>
<cov>Pavlovsky advises the Kremlin and President Putin personally
<par>Gleb Pavlovsky, President of the Effective Politics Foundation, political technologist, and Real Politics program host, is the highest rated advisor in Russia. In fact, Pavlovsky advises the Kremlin and President Putin personally. Once a dissenter at odds with the Soviet regime, he has been known as one of the founding fathers of public relations in Russia and guru of political technologies since the early 1990's.
Question: Your political forecasts are known to be correct. What shall we expect in and from 2006?
Gleb Pavlovsky: Alas, we are a democracy, and politics in Russia is guided by the four-year electoral cycle. Or rather by the 4+4 cycle because the president is usually elected for a second term of office; the main political drama plays itself anew every eight years. 2006 will be approximately like 1998 when the president sacked the prime minister, when the president found himself under attack, when there was the so-called railroad war, and everything ended in default. Boris Yeltsin found himself facing a nearly equally strong rival, Yevgeny Primakov, by the end of the year... In the meantime, I do not expect a default in 2006, because nothing in the economic sphere warrants it. Neither do I expect that Mikhail Fradkov will be necessarily ousted. The government has become noticeably more active and energetic (even though it should have done so long ago).
Question: If the government is not nearly as efficient as it should be, why would the president not disband it? Is he short of personnel or what?
Gleb Pavlovsky: There are no problems with personnel as a matter of fact because the president learned to move people horizontally. But sacking the premier just for the fun of it - what for? Let everyone prove his worth and show what he is capable of. All the same, the cycle is drawing to its completion, and that will show yet in 2006. There will be attempts to rock the boat, to restrain Putin who is consolidating his position which very many view as a danger to their plans. Perhaps, even some attempts to stab him in the back by orchestration of provocations and mass disturbances. Something like the railroad war, you know. I'm not saying of course that it will be staged by the so called opposition which is really anything but. No, some men, who are never in the spotlight, the men who have no political principles at all, will stage it. Money is all they want, and these men will do their best to benefit from Operation Russia Without Putin.
Question: Could you give names, please?
Gleb Pavlovsky: Boris Abramovich Berezovsky. When the Orange Revolution occurred in Ukraine, he announced that he had spent $23 million to have the new regime installed (I do not think he used his own money, for that matter) and demanded from the Ukrainian authorities $4 million and a portfolio in the Cabinet. I read about it in the Ukrainian media, you know. As for the potential coup d'etat in Russia, much more than that is expected from it because it will be a grandiose financial operation indeed. The men I've already mentioned believe that since they pulled it off in 1991, they may reasonably count on the ability to pull it off again.
Question: But what is preventing Berezovsky or other Russian oligarchs from returning into big-time politics through support of some potential successors and not through alliances with men like Eduard Limonov?
Gleb Pavlovsky: They need someone who depends on them. As for Putin, he does not need a successor of the kind Yeltsin needed once - someone to serve as a shield between him and the voter. Putin will approach the election as a potent president and acknowledged national leader. Only a strong president may be the head of the state in Russia. Putin will never permit gambles with "the crown of the Russian Empire".
Question: In order to have a strong president in Russia, will his rivals have to be weakened? Say, Motherland leader Dmitry Rogozin...
Gleb Pavlovsky: Don't make me laugh. Rogozin is not a rival. His personal rating is but 50% of the Motherland's at best.
Question: Could Mikhail Kasyanov become a rival provided he formed a democratic coalition?
Gleb Pavlovsky: A bureaucratic coalition is all he could ever come up with, a coalition of chiefs of departments, their deputies, advisers, and secretaries. Even that only if the authorities permit this split of the officialdom the way Leonid Kuchma permitted it in Ukraine. Putin knows better than that. Kasyanov's personal fan club is his utter maximum, but fan clubs are not what is brought into the Duma.
Question: Where are these new politicians the country needs? Where will they appear from?
Gleb Pavlovsky: They have not made it to the scene yet because of traffic jams. The traffic is organized in such a manner that rivals cannot reach the destination. I know the men objectively capable of more than managing their business ventures or operating on a municipal level. Unfortunately, they are compelled to wait because there hangs above them all the bureaucratic ceiling of the former, of ex-officials of the state, of Kasyanov's fan-club for example. Young men have to be promoted but that is precisely where difficulties are encountered. Unlike in the 1930's, the upper echelons cannot be filled with young commissars. Since the upper echelons are out of reach, the middle level should be renovated. Some mysterious men have taken it over and will not be bulged or ousted. The upper echelons have to be jolted into action to oust these men from the middle level and that's precisely what Putin has been doing. He stirs personnel and organizes vacancy fairs like the one in United Russia. On the other hand, it is being done slowly and with apprehension.
Question: What do we need? What essentially is a one-party system (United Russia) for?
Gleb Pavlovsky: Because nobody has the will or strength for a second party. Putin told Gennady Zyuganov two years ago that there are traditions in Russian social democracy, that the left flank of the political spectrum is idle... but Zyuganov holds on to his position refusing to make room for the young. In other words, the one-party system is inadvertently set up by United Russia's rivals themselves.
On the other hand, there is the rule that when one party prevails over all others in various countries (say, Italy, Japan, Mexico), parties like that usually hold their positions for two electoral cycles. Unless United Russia does something really stupid, it may poll the majority in 2007, and again in 2011.
Question: But the people are not precisely happy with United Russia even now! Social benefits-to-money conversion alone was already something...
Gleb Pavlovsky: Yes, the people air their grudges against it as the ruling party but do not want any other authorities.
Question: What are the chances of the democratic forces that made it to the Moscow municipal legislature? Do you think that may return to the Duma as well?
Gleb Pavlovsky: I do not know how they managed to scale the 7% barrier. Should they try to play these weird games on the nationwide level, they will never make it to the Duma. Should they try to don the role of populists, they will discover that they have much stronger rivals in this sphere than they themselves will ever become.
Question: Why is it that all parties are formed "from the top"? It is surely possible to form them from the other direction.
Gleb Pavlovsky: Not anymore. This initiative has been bred out of the people. Political parties were neglected all through the 1990's when they existed in the Duma only for show - like in the Sokhumi Monkey-House. All of that ended with the 1999 election when political parties proved unable to nominate candidates for president. Not one promising candidate (Putin, Primakov, or Yuri Luzhkov) was nominated by political parties.
Putin is planting political parties now. He forces them to form regional organizations. Nobody wants to go to the trouble, and fictitious lists are compiled. I'm under the impression that United Russia is the only structure that really wants the power and nobody else does. In fact, this is the only political party with grand potential.
Question: Will the Kremlin back Alexander Lukashenko for president of Belarus?
Gleb Pavlovsky: Belarus is our ally and we are not out to double-cross it. We will the president of Belarus luck. On the other hand, we are not always convinced that he knows clearly how he can help himself. This year, Belarus may count on a dramatic deterioration of its relations with the West. Sure, we will defend our allies. The Kremlin knows all too well that the attacks on Belarus are really targeted at Moscow, not at Minsk. Why? The answer is clear. Belarus is viewed as a chink in Putin's armor. Nikita Khrushchev once helped Cuba out saying "Let's drive a nail up America's ass!" Well, countries of the West have the idea of staging a coup in Belarus and thus drive a nail up Russia's ass. They count on the Slavs' inability to coordinate their efforts. They believe that Lukashenko will implement one plan and Russia another. I hope that we will not give them the pleasure of seeing us in disarray.
Question: The Public House, what was it formed for? With your active help, I hear...
Gleb Pavlovsky: Do you disagree with the assumption that this is a body comprising the best of what Russia has to offer, the pick of the crop? Shame on you! In fact, the idea of the Public House was born at the Civic Forum in 2001. Time has come to give society a chance to leave behind its provincial outlook, to abandon all petty quarrels and intrigues. There are people in Russia whose opinions are sought but who are not in the corridors of power. Hence, the attempt to muster all these people and band them together. If they turn out to be the wrong people for the job, well, disband the country and form another.
<tit>
POLITICAL FORECAST FOR 2006<aut>Vladimir Rudakov, Dmitry Mindich, Maria Barinova
<src>Profil, No 1, January, 2006, pp. 18 - 26
<sum>Everyone is convinced that 2006 will be the quietest, politically, in Russia's new history. Political stability resembles stagnation precisely because it was established to last. And yet, some surprises should be expected both in the country and in its relations with neighbors.</sum>
<cov>2005 was great for Russian authorities
<par>The powers-that-be
2005 was great for Russian authorities. Nothing happened to sour the relations of trust between the powers-that-be and society. Surplus of the budget enabled the government to boost compensations and the smoothly working machine of state PR diverted the attention of the population to less pressing matters.
Last autumn, the Kremlin initiated national projects in the social sphere on a major scale. As a result, the population's fears of forthcoming changes in the social sphere with the inevitable negative consequences gradually gave way to expectations of a breakthrough in the social sphere also inevitable in case the proclaimed projects became successful.
Dmitry Medvedev was put in charge of the national projects and his promotion to the foreground in the government reinforced the suspicions that the national projects in question should become the powerful social-PR background for the transfer of power in 2008.
<itl>Senior deputy premiership is coveted for the chance to be promoted to full premiership in time. Medvedev's promotion made the possibility of Mikhail Fradkov's resignation more than a distinct possibility. The promotion made it a factor of political processes in Russia. That is what makes 2006, the year of "permanent resignation of the Cabinet": the conviction that Medvedev needs some time to mature for premiership remains practically the only reason to keep Fradkov where he currently is. In any case, this conviction will inevitably evolve into the conviction that "the times seems to have come" sooner rather than later. It means Fradkov's transformation from the so-called technical premier into a lame duck in 2006. Everyone will be waiting for him to go in 2006.
In the meantime, Medvedev the Successor is probably only one of the variants of power transfer in 2008. Even that, however, does not improve Fradkov's chances of lasting as the prime minister until the end of 2006. Regardless of who becomes the bona fide successor, his ascension to presidency will apparently begin with premiership.
<itl>As a result, there are at least several variants of replacement of Fradkov with someone else - the most plausible political combination of the year.
<itl>Scenario One: the one that leaps to mind. Medvedev becomes the prime minister. The country should not expect any grandiose staff shuffles in this case. First, their absence will symbolize faithfulness to the previously chosen course (transition of the whole system of socioeconomic relations to free-market principles coupled with implementation of national projects). Second, it will emphasize the planned nature of replacement of the prime minister.
<itl>Scenario Two: unexpected. "A man from nowhere" becomes the premier (someone like Fradkov himself when he was a representative to the EU before his promotion to premiership). Some experts say that Director of the Presidential Administration Sergei Sobyanin may be him. Or Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov. Their promotion to premiership may become a step closer to formation of a party Cabinet which will be eventually led by Putin when he is no longer the president. In the meantime, it does not mean eventual presidency for whoever is chosen at this point, Sobyanin or Gryzlov. Somebody else may become the president, even Medvedev.
<itl>Scenario Three: unpleasant. Some "strong arm" may replace Fradkov - say, because of the escalation of the danger of terrorism or because of some other factors. In fact, even someone from secret services may be found desirable as the prime minister - and not necessarily Sergei Ivanov.
<itl>Scenario Four: nearly inconceivable. Premiership is offered to and accepted by someone nobody even contemplated; either because of the total lack of political aspirations or because of non-involvement with any political clans (if and as much as it is possible in the first place). He may be a liberal bureaucrat from elsewhere rather than the team from St.Petersburg. What with the last year promotion of Sobyanin from Tyumen to the presidential administration, the ruling elite may take promotion of this man as an attempt on the president's part to enlist personnel not only in the St.Petersburg team. Moreover, it will balance out the chances of clans in the inner circle itself, and that may be important for success of the final phase of Operation Successor. This role may actually be given to Deputy Premier Alexander Zhukov, a professional of unquestionable skills and (to quote one of his former Duma colleagues) an "a-political liberal with the repute of a no-conflict man." It is clear of course that even that promotion will not imply any presidential prospects but who says the successor must be a prime minister before?
The Kremlin began fine-tuning the regional personnel in 2005. Despite expectations, transition from gubernatorial elections to appointment of governors did not result in a mass purge.
As it turned out, the Kremlin needed the ability to sack governors when it sees fit rather than the chance to do so right away. In other words, official Moscow chose to keep regional leaders in suspense rather than kick up quarrels with the most odious of them.
<itl>"The policy of forcing regional leaders to concentrate all their attention on economic matters will be brought to its logical end," a source in the presidential administration said. The Kremlin will try to eliminate the possibility of seeing governors' proteges becoming heads of local organizations of the ruling United Russia. "The party vertical must be isolated from the administrative one for good, but the task is truly difficult," the source admitted. It succeeds, however, the Kremlin will all but restore the Soviet system where local administrators (from director of a factory to the head of the regional executive committee) were in the focus of attention of local party bosses - secretaries of regional party committees.
<par>The opposition
2005 was a year of failures of the opposition - left and liberal alike.
All opposition, everyone disagreeing with the Kremlin, became noticeably more marginal in 2005. On the other hand, it was futile to expect anything else in the situation when the ruling party occupies practically all of the public politics and even the political agenda is such that it is formed by the Kremlin (actually, by the president himself who retains an unprecedented rating). Add here the growth of the people's income, and the conclusion is inevitable: electoral potential of the opposition is going down.
<itl>In fact, all of that goes for the traditional political forces. Beginning mass protest actions caused by the social benefits-to-money conversion, 2005 exposed existence in society of the previously obscure political trends with fine chances of evolvement into political forces beyond the system. First and foremost, the matter concerns nationalists.
Aware of the necessity to fight these beyond-the-system forces, the Kremlin made an emphasis on youth. Ours, Young Guard, Locals - all these projects are intended to neutralize the impromptu element in politics.
<itl>Some experts say that in order to solve the problem for good, the Kremlin will be compelled to initiate one other "national project" in 2006, that of formation of a powerful but constructive (i.e. loyal) opposition to "His Majesty".
<itl>The United Russia "wings" - both the right and the left - will do depending on what project promises to be more constructive this time. The new law "On political parties" demanding compulsory registration of all parties this year will provide a convenient background for mustering of all parties that are cast out for any reason under the flag of constructive opposition. As a result, the Kremlin will go to the 2007 parliamentary election in two echelons - the ruling party and the party of the constructive opposition.
<par>The Caucasus
Control over and normalization of the situation in the Caucasus in general and particularly in Chechnya will attain strategic importance as the federal elections draw closer.
The political year (2005, that is) in Chechnya began with extermination of President of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov. Solution to the problem of Maskhadov, a legitimate leader of Chechen resistance in the eyes of the West, automatically closed the subject of negotiations with separatists.
As a matter of fact, Maskhadov's death became but an element of settlement in Chechnya. Continuation of "kadyrization" of the republic became another, much more important factor, of stabilization. Election of the republican parliament (it is now comprised only of the parties and candidates that secured Ramzan Kadyrov's support) fortified the positions of the senior deputy premier. Since it is the republican parliament that will vote for the candidate for president nominated by the Kremlin, Ramzan's chances to become the president of Chechnya grew enormously. Moreover, in late 2005, he himself aspired for leadership in the Chechen organization of United Russia - despite misgivings and outright protests on the part of party leaders. As of this year, the party that wins the parliamentary election in its respective region will nominate its candidate for regional leadership.
<itl>Since the senior deputy premier controls practically all financial and administrative resources in Chechnya, his chances of becoming the president are not to be dismissed indeed. Age is the only obstacle because anyone under 30 years cannot be the president of Chechnya by its constitution. Well, Kadyrov will become 30 on October 5, 2006. That will make resignation of President Alu Alkhanov practically inevitable.
<itl>This scenario may only be thwarted by the Kremlin's determination. In fact, the voices objecting to this concentration of practically unlimited power in the hands of Kadyrov are getting louder and louder in official Moscow. As a matter of fact, however, the hopes that the Kremlin will decide to quarrel with the protege are probably futile. According to the rumors, the president himself values the Kadyrovs' contribution to pacification of Chechnya and refuses to even contemplate withdrawal of his support of the clan in question. Even though this position openly collides with Moscow's policy of doing away with the clannish system in the Caucasus in order to make the local regimes more adequate and efficient.
Presidential Envoy Dmitry Kozak who made a report on the situation in Dagestan and in the Caucasus in general initiated the process.
His report proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the worst threats to the Caucasus are internal rather than external. First and foremost, they boil down to the corrupt clannish nature of the power system in the republic.
In the meantime, the Kremlin in 2005, never summoned the guts to do anything about it. On the other hand, the federal center cannot fail to change at least something. The situation in Kabardino-Balkaria was barely kept in hand in the wake of the attack of the local Wahhabi underground last October. Gunmen's attempt to take Nalchik over failed but even a shallow analysis of the composition of the attackers (most of them being local youths, and not mature gunmen who had descended from the mountains) proves radicalization of the most active part of the population of the region.
<itl>The situation being what it is, one of the real means of dealing with this state of affairs and normalization of the crises in the Caucasus may come down to a special program (another kind of national project) of stabilization to be run by some special body like the presidential council for national projects oversight.
<itl>By the most optimistic scenario, existence and efficiency of this "body above clans" will minimize as much as possible the theft of financial resources. At the very least, it will minimize clans' clout with the use of the said resources.
<itl>Russia and its neighbors
Where relations with the neighbors are concerned, the 2005 political year began for Russia with the triumph of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in late 2004. The so-called Orange Alarm proved more important for the political developments in Russia itself than for its policy in the post-Soviet zone.
Nothing indicated the possibility of similar developments in Russia but the powers-that-be concentrated on counterrevolutionary activities. To quote political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky, "establishment of the atmosphere of the Orange Danger in Russia was necessary for the powers-that-be in the Russian Federation first and foremost for establishment of an infrastructure of the war on the hypothetical threat and for presenting themselves as the lesser evil."
A dilemma was therefore formed and offered to society: either consolidate around the authorities and retain the sovereign state living by its own laws (the theory of "sovereign democracy") or face the music i.e. political chaos and installation of a puppet regime like in Ukraine and Georgia with the prospect of disintegration of the country looming ahead.
<itl>Actually, 2006, is unlikely to benefit the authorities from this standpoint because the "orange threat" has used up its potential. Preventive counterrevolutionary measures were taken beginning with the amendment to the electoral legislation banning blocs and ending with the new law on non-government organizations enforcing stiff state control over them.
2005 became a year of breakthrough in Russia's relations with post-Soviet countries. This was the first year when the Kremlin openly proclaimed its intention to wield clout with the processes under way in the post-Soviet zone - with everything handy from support of pro-Russian forces there to gas prices.
<itl>Even though its previous efforts to play the role of the CIS arbiter failed, the Kremlin may be counted on not to abandon its aspirations.
<itl>From this standpoint, the gas crisis in the relations with Ukraine may become the herald of the Kremlin's new policy. The policy that will be applied to the openly pro-Western countries of the Commonwealth (like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) and to the countries traditionally viewed as Moscow's allies (Armenia and even Belarus). The motives are simple and clear: the desire to keep them close in the orbit of influence and prevent their drift to the West. That may be accomplished by initiation of an exchange of objects of infrastructure for energy resources from Russia.
The situation being what it is, however, format of the Commonwealth does not suit Russia and its purposes. Even Vladimir Putin made it plain in 2005, that he regards this structure as but a political fossil and leftover from the 1990's. Hence, the chance of the Commonwealth, the club of presidents as it is also known, to become truly history in 2006. Russia itself may initiate the process.
Additional pressure applied to partners is also ascribed to the fact that revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia all but deprived the Kremlin of the initiative in the choice of allies among neighbors. It is the countries the West has turned its back to that are the closest to Russia at this point, the regimes of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan was one of the key members of GUUAM last year and promoted a policy fairly independent from Russia. It was the events in Andizhan and the isolation from the West they resulted in that led Uzbekistan into Russia's embrace. It goes without saying that the cost of this allegiance cannot be very high. That is why the Kremlin is activating economic leverage.
<itl>On the other hand, the "big valve" policy is a delicate instrument. As it turned out, it is only good for quiet negotiations and not as a weapon in public conflicts. Crisis in the gas relations with Ukraine all but jeopardized the image of Russia as a reliable provider of energy resources. It stands to reason to expect that the Kremlin will abstain from so directly rude actions in the future as they may question the plans of Russia's transformation into an energy super power.
<par>Russia and the world
It was exactly in 2005 that Russia finally converted its energy export into political dividends.
First, the West became convinced that high oil and gas prices are something serious that will not be over tomorrow. Second, it became convinced that the Russian regime can ensure political and economic stability and therefore uninterrupted export of energy and fuel.
As a result, Russia came to be regarded as a major factor of energy security of the European Union. As a result, the previously popular subject of democratic freedoms and human rights in Russia faded into the background. It was a kind of deal: oil and gas in return for recognition of specifics of our "sovereign democracy" by the West.
Generally speaking, the European Union does not have any other alternative. Seventy per cent of the world stock of gas is concentrated in Russia. Sure, Europe can diminish its dependence on Russian gas but it will take decades.
<itl>In the meantime, some specialists say that this forced integration of Russia into Europe is beginning to grate on the Europeans' nerves. The report of the European Commission to the EU summit come March will state that Brussels demands a common energy policy for all EU countries. A policy like that will cut down Russia's room for maneuvering and make development of "special relations" with separate European leaders all the more difficult.
For the time being, however, Russia's gas friendship with the European Union will only develop. Provided Russia treats the gas valve with care and does not use this argument too frequently to show its neighbors their right place in the greater scheme of things. It stands to reason to expect Russia's G8 presidency to be dedicated to facilitation of the so called "energy brotherhood".
RVR
