The forum often touches on aspects of what Putin's intentions really are.
MAD<BAD,SAD?The Kremlin has annexed the Crimean peninsula (the site of an important Russian naval base) and stoked a separatist rebellion in two of Ukraine’s easternmost provinces, Lugansk and Donetsk. The rebels, with strong Russian military and intelligence backing, have proclaimed “people’s republics” there and have continued to advance into the rest of Ukraine, in defiance of a ceasefire agreed in Minsk in September. Ukraine is desperate for financial and military help from the West. America is mulling arms deliveries, but holding back to see if a last-ditch Franco-German diplomatic deal can bring a truce. Few outside Russia believe the Kremlin’s justification for the war. Russians in Ukraine were not being persecuted. The government in Kiev is not “fascist” (extreme-right parties fare worse in Ukraine than they do in Western Europe). Far from menacing Russia, NATO countries have slashed defence spending, just as Russia is rearming.
The three main theories about Vladimir Putin’s motivations could be summed up as “bad”, “mad” or “sad”.http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/02/economist-explains-10?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/whatrussiaisuptoinukraineDeglobalizing RussiaWhen Vladimir Putin won the presidential election in 2000, there was no doubt that his vision was to integrate Russia into the global mainstream. His core economic program, which was developed by then economic minister Herman Gref, included among other things joining the WTO as soon as possible.
In practice, the pro-globalization rhetoric of Putin’s elites has always coexisted with protectionist policies and resistance to integration. Russia eventually managed to join the WTO, but only in 2012. Both before and after that, the government took numerous steps aimed at undermining free trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2006, Russia forced the Shell-led Sakhalin energy consortium to sell a majority stake to Gazprom. In 2008, the Kremlin adopted a list of more than 30 sectors (including broadcasting, fishing, and publishing) in which foreign investment was subject to government approval; this list eventually expanded to include 45 industries. Even in industries not on the list, there were multiple cases in which foreign investors were quietly dissuaded as their acquisition targets were slated for takeover by politically connected Russian businesses that did not like competition.
Given the high level of corruption in Russia,1 these moves were not unexpected. However, the overall vision of a more globalized Russia was never questioned—until 2014. Even as Russia’s economy under Putin grew more corrupt and more statist, it was also becoming more and more integrated into the global economy.
The Ukraine crisis changed everything.
Read more at:
http://carnegie.ru/2015/12/16/deglobalizing-russia/in6d
