It's Russia's Gas!

[Ste]

I've got the opposite problem! Nad' wants the heating on all night like in Russia and I dread the gas bill next quarter!

Plus I can't stand the noise of the boiler, I can hear it in the garage.....

We Brits are used to freezing our bollocks off in the night, even now at 44 I need no nightly visits to the bathroom, even when beered up, toughens the bladder, doncha know!

When I was in Russia I had to open both of the weird double windows, too bloody hot. This was in Urals in feb too.

So add that to cost of RW, 24/7 gas.......

Ste

[Elen]

I think this situation is a lot more damaging to Russia then to Ukraine, as the G8 powers who were already reluctant to accept Russia as a member--let alone assume the presidency--now have confirmation that Russia is a wild card.

And Ukraine which can't pay for goods but preferring to steal them is "civilized" card for sure
What is that  'confirmation" btw?

As for me that a dission to build that new gas line by-pass Ukraine just shows better who G8 sees like an area to be "avoided" for not to have troubles

[andrewfi]

Elen makes a good point. It is entirely clear that Gazprom sees Ukraine as its major choke point in gas delivery, if it did not then they would simply not bother with the Baltic link.

I am certain that whatever the European energy ministers say, for public consumption, they are now fullyaware of what Ukraine does and has been doing. Iwas looking at the details (as far as they are known) of the deal between Naftogaz and Gazprom. The most significant factor,other than the real arrangements for pricing, is that the Russians have now succeeded in decoupling transport and delivery. Now, if any gas goes missing, the Russians know exactly what happened, there are no more excuses or smokescreens available to the Ukrainians. This is important because Ukraine owes money amounting to a couple of years of gas supply, in respect of previous unpaid gas, both sold and stolen. Even if Gazprom got no higher price for its supplies, this alone is worth having. Doubling the price for their gas as well is simply bunce! I also expect that Russia will end up not supplying Turkmen gas to Ukraine, but will sell its own, given that the marginal cost of each additional cubic meter to Russia is negligable.

Notwithstanding what has been said inthe press over the past few days, I am pretty sure that Putin thinks 'Da boyz done good!'

[Rvrwind]

Yes STE it is Natural Gas but it is also liquified, it could not be pumped such distances without being so.

I got to agree with Elen when she asks about the Widcard statement. Really!!!! Ukraine steals & conives but Russia is the Wildcard for protecting its own interests. I find it hard to believe anybody is actually stupid enough to believe that argument. Ukraine is finally showing thier true colors. They want to be buddy buddy with the west, then by all means be my guest, but realize it comes with a price.

The new pipline across the floor of the Baltic Sea is a deliberate move by Russia to avoid any further blackmail & theft by Ukraine & Poland. Russia is taking control & they don't like it, well too friggin' bad I say. Tymeschenko started this battle but I assure you Alexi Miller will finish it, with Putin's help. This is just the beginning, it ain't over till the fat lady sings!!!

RVR - Canadian Cowboy/Agency Owner

[andrewfi]

Actually Richard that is not correct. The gas is pressurised in the pipeline at between 200-500 psi which reduces its volume by up to 600 times, this also provides the impetus to propel the gas through the pipeline.

http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/transport.asp

[groovlstk]

Ukraine is not a G8 member and certainly won't be in my lifetime. Russia lobbied hard to be included in key financial and economic discussions and until recently weren't full-fledged members. They are a "wildcard" in the eyes of G7 precisely because of goofy moves like the shutdown. You don't lobby to have a major voice in global issues and then send ripples through the economies of eight other nations to prove a point.

[jb]

Political  correctness also perverts historical reality. For example, everything connected  with the oil industry is now popularly portrayed (mostly a Hollywood stereotype) as corrupt and  exploitive, with no hint that petroleum actually fuels all civilization. You may  not like to see oil rigs in your back yard, or stinky old refineries on your commute  to work, but someone has to find, refine, and deliver the gas each morning for your  cars.  We often confuse simple business needs  with greed.

          And who are  the really greedy? Do the simple arithmetic of pumping petroleum in the desert.  After expenses of typically under $5 a barrel, rigged and corrupt cartels in the Middle  East - run by the ever faithful Iranian mullahs, Gulf royals or Libyan autocrats - sell it on the  world market for between $50 to $60, and you have your answers. They don't  merely price gouge Americans in their love affairs with SUVs, but also  third-world struggling economies in places like Africa, Latin America, and  Ukraine.

      I do not condemn  Russian oil business interests for wanting to minimize losses in the Ukraine at all.  If an American business were running things,  the attitude would be to let the thieving bastards freeze in the dark before  they would negotiate a new pipeline deal that they knew would be subject to  wholesale thievery.  And the stock  holders would rightly throw the managing team out on the street if they cut a  deal otherwise.

  I say: good for you, Gasprom, protect your own interests.

[Shadow]

Actually Richard that is not correct. The gas is pressurised in the pipeline at between 200-500 psi which reduces its volume by up to 600 times, this also provides the impetus to propel the gas through the pipeline.

http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/transport.asp

Correct Andrew, and a short term solution to the gas transport problem already exists. A company in China is building mother-daughter stations, with the Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) transported by trucks. No need to have pipelines, or big infrastructure. At the 2008 Olympics the taxis and buses will run on a mixof LPG (liquified petroleum gas) and CNG (compressed natural gas).

CNG is one of the most environmental safe fuels, and almost any current car engine can be converted to run it as fuel.

[Rvrwind]

Okay, so it ain't exactly liquid, but damn close to it. Technicalities!!! Sheesh!!!!

That being niether here nor there, it comes down to its Russia's gas, period. That gives them all the rights in the world to turn off the damn tap & let the bastards freeze if that is the only way to stop it from being stolen. If the Ukrainian public has a problem with that, well maybe they outa talk to the thievin' bastards runnin' their country.

You don't lobby to have a major voice in global issues and then send ripples through the economies of eight other nations to prove a point.

Tell you what, if it was my gas, I'd rock the whole friggin' world if thats what it would take to get my point across. Ukraine is the bad guy in this story, not Russia. Ukraine is lobbying to join NATO, is stealing gas a credit card for instant entry? Maybe somebody should mention that to the powers that be. Of course the west will always point the finger at Russia no matter what the circumstances, thats just historical fact.

RVR - Canadian Cowboy/Agency Owner

[Admin]

Tell you what, if it was my gas, I'd rock the whole friggin' world if thats what it would take to get my point across. Ukraine is the bad guy in this story, not Russia. Ukraine is lobbying to join NATO, is stealing gas a credit card for instant entry? Maybe somebody should mention that to the powers that be. Of course the west will always point the finger at Russia no matter what the circumstances, thats just historical fact.

RVR - Canadian Cowboy/Agency Owner

Richard, you are right - of course. Russia does seem to receive a great deal of vilification in the western press. Whether deserved, or not, I don't know - but I tend to think the western press presents things in an overblown, hyper-sensationalized manner - so I don't put much stock in it.

However, in the case of Ukraine - they have not always been capable of such acts as thievery or political posturing. Historically-speaking, one need only look back not even 100 years to the Holodomor to see that Ukraine has suffered mightily at the hands of her bigger neighbor to the North (and East). Indeed, her suffering at Stalin's hand may be nearly unprecedented in modern history.

All I am saying is - the gas issue has many faces. I doubt it is quite as clear as anyone is making it out to be.

- Dan

[Leslie]

I am not going to argue on the economic side here. 

On this very rare occasion I actually agree with Elen

Gazprom has what it wants from this debacle.  Increased prices,  secure transit for it's gas through Ukraine and now that Germany is running scared on securing it's gas supplies - Western European capital and expertise for building the Baltic pipeline.  I reckon this will be finished now by 2010.

Dan, our wives are from western Ukraine if my memory serves me correctly.  This means a different perspective.  A winning hand for Gazprom does not mean a winning hand for Russian political influence in Ukraine. 

Quite the reverse in fact.

Any notion that this action will increase the political influence of the pro Russian lobby is fiction.  Read the press.  Watch the TV news.  Yushenko's Orange revolution has not fulfilled it's promise.  Maybe this political coalition will lose power but there is NO CHANCE of Ukraine returning to a Russian satellite state or the election of a Putin sponsored  political faction to government.   The future will bring the election of a government in Ukraine which is even more hostile to Russia. 

Ukrainians have long experience of "punishments" imposed by Moscow.  Putin's actions merely add natural gas as fuel to the fire of Ukrainian nationalism....

 

 

[Admin]

Here is an interesting read about the gas crisis - and more (from the stratfor.com website):

  Russia's Gas Strategy: Turning Up the Heat on Ukraine
By Peter Zeihan

  During the past few weeks, Russia and Ukraine have been arguing over the terms of their natural gas supply contracts. Under previous arrangements -- struck in efforts by Moscow to influence the outcome of Ukraine's presidential election in 2004 -- Russia's state-owned monopoly Gazprom supplied Ukraine with natural gas at the rate of $50 per 1,000 cubic meters. But Russia's preferred presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, lost the 2004 election to the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. That
loss, combined with Russia's hopes of raising income levels in general (or, switching "to a market basis," in Gazprom-speak) prompted Moscow to demand payments of $230 per 1,000 cubic meters from Ukraine -- terms Kiev refused. Gazprom then sliced its exports to Ukraine on Jan. 1, triggering a European uproar. Because Europe also depends heavily on Russian natural gas -- with 80 percent of those supplies transiting Ukraine -- the Russian cutoff hurt Europe rather than Kiev.

  On Jan. 4, Moscow and Kiev settled the matter by agreeing to a compromise five-year contract. Under terms of that deal, natural gas from the Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will be transported through Russia, making up a mix that would supply Ukraine at a rate of $95 per 1,000 cubic meters. Any Russian gas fed into that mix will be sold at Gazprom's full rate of $230.

  From a strictly commercial standpoint, all now seems right with the world. The Central Asians, who previously were able to sell natural gas only to the heavily subsidized Russian market, now have gained a significant export market for their supplies; the Ukrainians have substituted a mere doubling in prices for what would have been a fourfold increase; and the Europeans have their natural gas supplies re-established.

  But that is not the really interesting -- much less important -- part of what has just occurred. When the crisis first erupted, it centered on Russia's desire to reassert influence directly in Ukraine; but as the game has played out, it has come to center on Russia's ability to use Europe as a lever.

  The Ukrainian Keystone

  From the beginning, the natural gas spat has been about much more than a few (billion) dollars in annual energy sales. This squabble is over the orientation of Ukraine between West and East, and ultimately over the ability of Russia to regenerate its geopolitical fortunes.

  Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" was a seminal event in the Russian mind -- a jarring development that ranks second only to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Russians view the Soviet collapse as the day they lost their empire, and they fear that history may mark the Orange Revolution as the day that Russia degraded past the point of no return.

  Viewed from any angle, Ukraine is critical to the long-term defense and survival of the Russian state. This is not about ethnic kin, although eastern Ukraine does host the largest Russian community in the world outside of Russia. Even before the Soviet era, Ukraine was integrated into the industrial and agricultural heartland of Russia; today, it not only is the transit point for Russian natural gas to Europe, but actually is a connecting point for nearly all the country's meaningful infrastructure between East and West -- whether of the pipe, road, power or rail variety.

  Politically and militarily, a Russia denied Ukraine cannot easily project power into the Northern Caucasus. Nor could Moscow reliably exert control over Belarus, since that country's primary water transport route, the Dnieper, flows south to Ukraine, and it is nearly as well linked into Poland and the Baltics as it is to Russia proper. That geographic reality means that, should anything happen to the government of pro-Russian President Alexander Lukashenko, Minsk's geopolitical orientation could quite easily shift to match Ukraine's.

  And of course, taking the long view, it is easy to see why the Russians are so nervous. Ukraine pushes deep into the former Soviet territory, with borders a mere 300 miles from either Volgograd or Moscow, and the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol on the Black Sea has long been Russia's only deep, warm-water port. There are no European armies prepared to march east now, nor are there likely to be anytime soon, but throughout history -- apart from the Soviet period -- Europe has profited from Russian weakness. Without meaningful influence over Ukraine, Russia has no reliable links to Europe, no reliable control over Belarus, a pinched supply line to the Caucasus -- where an insurgency rages -- no navy to speak of and, most importantly for a country with no natural borders, significantly less strategic depth.

  Simply put, with Ukraine in its orbit, Russia maintains strategic coherence and a chance of eventually reattaining superpower status. Without Ukraine, Russia's status as a regional power grows tenuous, and the issue of Russia's outright disintegration leaves the realm of the ridiculous and enters the realm of the possible.

  This is not about money; it is about control and survival.

  Russia's Thin Wedge

  Ukraine's position in the natural gas dispute has been to take advantage of the fundamental duality in Russian foreign policy. On one hand, the Russian leadership fully realizes just how critical Ukraine is to its national interests. But on the other hand, Russia must have at least relatively warm relations with the Europeans -- if for no reason other than to keep its options open.

  Ukraine has viewed the natural gas issue as an opportunity to present the Russians with a zero-sum game. Kiev did not see the need to agree to pay European price levels because its leaders knew that Russia could not afford to cut off supplies -- that would ruin relations with Europe. Additionally, encouragement from the United States -- the most enthusiastic supporter of Ukraine's Orange Revolution -- gave the Yushchenko government a bit of an invulnerability complex, and encouraged Kiev to push the Russians consistently and painfully.

  There was also a timing issue. Since the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko has been having a rocky ride, and his popularity is at an all-time low. With parliamentary elections scheduled for March, he needed an anti-Russian crisis in order to bleed support away from Yanukovich's party. But what Yushchenko -- or, for that matter, many Europeans now congratulating themselves for their victory over Russia -- appears not to realize is that Russia has changed.

  In mid-November, Russian President Vladimir Putin named Dmitry Medvedev as first deputy prime minister. Medvedev is a rather rare personality in Russian politics, in that he is a modernizer who has not become unrealistically optimistic about Russia ever looking like -- much less joining -- the West, and a nationalist who has not fallen prey to the debilitating paranoia that often characterizes Russian policy. He also happens to be Putin's protégé and the board chairman of Gazprom. The Ukraine natural gas crisis was his first Russian foreign-policy initiative. Medvedev, like all Russians, recognizes that his country's long-term prospects without Ukraine are, at best, bleak. That means that Russia's European relations have become of secondary importance -- they are no longer an end in their own right, but rather a means to other ends.

  Prior to the Jan. 1 shutoff, the Europeans had become complacent, unappreciative of the scope of their dependency upon Russia or how much they have taken a "friendly" Moscow for granted since the end -- or even before the end -- of the Cold War. Energy supplies to Europe continued throughout the Afghan war, the 1983 war scare, the Moscow Olympic boycott, the putsch against Gorbachev, the Soviet breakup, the Chechen war, the Kosovo war, and the enlargements of NATO and the EU. The Europeans grew confident that as far as energy supplies were concerned, the Russians -- while unpredictable in their rhetoric -- were rock-solid in their reliability.

  Medvedev's primary goal was to redefine European perceptions of Russia. As of Dec. 31, Western Europeans perceived Russia primarily as an easily dismissed, benign former foe. But with the Gazprom cutoff -- which diminished gas supplies needed for heating in the middle of winter -- Russia proved itself not only sufficiently erratic to be taken seriously, but also capable of inflicting very real pain with a modicum of effort.

  Now, did the Russians want to hurt the Europeans? Of course not. Europe, particularly "old" Europe, remains a potential partner for Moscow, and there is no reason for the Kremlin to introduce spite into an already complex relationship. But did the Russians want the Europeans to know that the Kremlin has the capacity and chutzpah to turn the screws? Absolutely. And doing so at a time of year when the wind whipping off the North Sea is anything but balmy adds that ever-incisive Russian touch. This is not about establishing trust, but about establishing in Europe a respect for Russia's strengths and an awareness of Russia's concerns.

  Which brings us back to Ukraine.

  Moscow wants to capitalize on Europe's dawning realization of Russia's forcefulness and convince the Europeans this is not just about Ukraine, but also about the United States. U.S. pressure made the Orange Revolution possible. U.S. support has emboldened Kiev -- even specifically on the natural gas issue.

  And now Ukraine's American-encouraged invulnerability complex has demonstrated an ability to endanger Europe's economic and personal well-being. However, unlike the Europeans, the Americans do not import so much as a molecule of Russian natural gas. For Washington, supporting Ukraine against Russia is a low-risk, high-payoff issue; for Europe, it is the reverse. When natural gas supplies dropped on Jan. 1, many Europeans were left wondering exactly what it was that they were supposed to get out of this revolution that the Americans were so excited about.

  The question for Europe now is simple: How to ensure that the Russians don't cut off the heat? The answer is equally simple: Take Russian interests in Ukraine to heart.

  The Fine Print

  This is hardly the end of the matter. The way the Russians set up the final compromise deal on Jan. 4 also gives them heretofore unheard-of flexibility in pressuring Ukraine and Europe in the future. Up to this point, Gazprom has maintained a monopoly on natural gas exports from the former Soviet states to Europe, and only Turkmenistan was allowed to export natural gas to Ukraine. This derives from a longstanding Gazprom position: Because the company is required to supply natural gas to the Russian market at prices below the cost of production, Gazprom has jealously protected its monopoly on exports. Turkmenistan was granted an exemption to supply a few former Soviet republics because Moscow, in an effort to maintain political alliances, dictated that their supplies should be subsidized. Gazprom, therefore, had Turkmenistan sell to its regional undesirables for peanuts, while the company pocketed hard currency from European customers paying top dollar.

  Under the new deal, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be able to sell natural gas directly to Ukraine at sharply higher rates than before. While that might seem like an improvement for Ukraine in terms of both political palatability -- the natural gas is not Russian -- and supply diversification, it is neither. Just as Russian natural gas must go through Ukraine en route to Europe, all Central Asian natural gas must go through Russia to reach Ukraine. The terms of the new agreement mean that Europe's natural gas supplies now will depend not only on the tenor of Russian-European and Russian-Ukrainian relations, but also on Russian-Kazakh, -Uzbek, and -Turkmen relations. Suddenly Europe has a vested, if reluctant, interest in ensuring that Moscow is satisfied with its level of influence in the bulk of the largest former Soviet
territories.

  Such developments cannot come as much of a shock to the United States. Truth be told, American policy toward Ukraine has been a bit of a Hail Mary all along. Washington's tools of influence in Ukraine and Russia are few and far between, and it cannot even pretend to offer an alternative energy supplier for the Europeans or Ukrainians. In fact, some of Washington's policies have even encouraged Europe's dependence on Russian energy: The Continent's most viable alternative to Russian natural gas is Iran -- which, with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regularly shouting "Death to Israel," is hardly a place the United States wants the Europeans to foster warm relations.

  The elegance of Medvedev's strategy lies in the fact that simply causing the Europeans to think about Russian interests means that the Kremlin has driven a wedge not only between the Europeans and the Ukrainians, but between the Europeans and the Americans. If Russia is to recover what it has lost in geopolitical stature these past 15 years, this is precisely the sort of policy that will give it a fighting chance.

  A Word on the Germans

  While Russia's perspective on the matter is certainly central, this is not all about Moscow -- Germany has a stake as well. There, Chancellor Angela Merkel is in a bit of a fix. Her East German roots prompt her instinctually to side with her fellow Central Europeans, and by extension, the Ukrainians. But she is hardly oblivious to the fact that Germany is the "old" European country that relies most heavily on Russian energy supplies. In Germany, more than in any European state, power rests upon location and economic strength (Germany has not had a military to speak of in more than a decade). With the one internationally approved vehicle for German ambition -- the European Union -- in rather less than the best shape, Berlin's options for furthering its interests are nil. Without energy to power its economy, Germany will remain the underwhelming geopolitical power it has been since the end of World War II.

  For most Central European states, this would be no large disaster -- if not for the possibility of flickering lights or sudden mid-winter cold. The Poles, Hungarians, Balts, Czechs and others -- all of whom have visceral memories of wartime experiences at German or Russian hands -- like the idea of German nationalism being contained by pan-European organizations such as the European Union, even if they do not embrace everything that the EU requires them to do. But now Medvedev's maneuvering will force Germany to take the greatest interest of all the European powers in keeping the Russians happy, even if Merkel might be personally inclined to let Moscow rot. Which means that, moving forward, whatever compromises are made in relations between Moscow and the West will be actively brokered by Berlin. And while that may ensure steady energy supplies to Europe, having affairs in the region managed by a de facto partnership between Germany and Russia is not the sort of development that will lead to restful nights in the vast tracts of easily-marchable land between Berlin and Moscow.

[jb]

As an aside, $230 per MCM  (1,000 cubic meters)  is pretty  cheap gas.  I wouldn't mind if our price for natural gas was  lowered to that price.  I just looked at my latest utility bill  and I see I'm being charged $8.83 per MCF  (1,000 cubic ft).   Since a cubic meter is 36 times bigger than a cubic foot,,, $8.83 X 36  = $317.88 per MCM.  It looks like Europe is getting a pretty good  deal on Russian gas at the full price of $230.00.

[docetae]

I'm working for a natural gas distributor, so my 2 cennes and a quick technical introduction :

- There are compression post at most of each distribution post.
- Each post , control, etc are monitored for pressure, temperature, etc variation
- You must bring natural gas at around -169 Celcius to get liquid gas ...
- The process to liquify natural gaz is very long
- There are two types of storage : natural, basicly you put back the gas from where it's coming. The less expensive and the most secure but you can not extract it at the same speed than for Natural gas and liquid, in this case, you must have a very good heating facility if you do not want to have a 5km perimeter around your storage frozen the year long ...
- The pipeline by itself is a storage facility

So if Ukraine stole some gas, this can be done only in  one pipeline with no direct connection with the russian one. And this is a tube, if you extract something, you must add the same to maintain pressure constant.

So russia can be very easely aware of any stolen gas just by the side effect.

Doc

[andrewfi]

docetae, that was the point. When pressure drops the RUssians know how much gas has gone and becasue there are pressure measuring points on both sides of Ukraine, botht he Germans and Russians know exactly where the gas went. In this case, Gazprom had invited Russian auditors to their pumping stations in Russia to audit the gas flow.

I do not think that the game is as complex as Peter Zeihan seems to think, but he has a column to write in the middle of the Russian Christmas holiday!

International politics is rarely so complex as he assumes because the outcomes from a given input are so random - commercial policies and strategy are much easier, one simply follows the money!

So in following the money what do we see? The Ukrainians were stealing and have been for years. In addition they have not been paying for what they have been buying. Gazprom now has been able to negotiate a deal whereby Naftogaz have admitted their thefts over the New Year period and agreed to pay for them. Their last remaining excuses for abstracting gas - payment for transport and imported gas from the 'stans have been removed and in addition Gazprom gets a much higher price for its gas sales to Naftogaz. The $230 is a fiction, there is no way that blending supplies from Turkmenistan and Russia could get close to generating such a revenue, unless the figure also included the payments for transport on a knock for knock basis, something both sides have said is not going to happen. Even if this was to happen, given the supply situation, the deficit is still about $45-50 per 1000 cubic meters.

[Bruno]

As an aside, $230 per MCM  (1,000 cubic meters)  is pretty cheap gas.  I wouldn't mind if our price for natural gas was lowered to that price.  I just looked at my latest utility bill and I see I'm being charged $8.83 per MCF  (1,000 cubic ft).  Since a cubic meter is 36 times bigger than a cubic foot,,, $8.83 X 36 = $317.88 per MCM.  It looks like Europe is getting a pretty good deal on Russian gas at the full price of $230.00.

 

Be happy JB... the $230 is the price pay to russia but not the final price...

Here, price used is by kwh... 1 m3 gaz is around 10 kwh...

At the 01/01/2006, the price was :

102.4 euro by kwh in Danemark ( highter price )... mean 1024 euro per MCM

24.4 euro by kwh in UK ( lower price )... mean 244 euro per MCM

The middle for Europe ( 15 ) is 50.3 euro by kwh, 503 euro per MCM

The middle for Europe ( 25 ) is 40.5 euro by kwh, 405 euro per MCM

Yes, our natural gaz is more expensive that the American one... first, the 230$ pay to russia, followed by the transit price from each compagny who own pipeline, followed by local distributor, and finally, your add local tax, european taxe, ...

All this make the gaz here more expensive that in USA... in Belgium, we pay 402 euro per MCM ( private use ) and 217 euro per MCM ( industry use : more that 11.63 gw by year or more of 1163 MCM )

So, again, be happy of your American price... only UK seem to have very low price...

[Ste]

.. only UK seem to have very low price...

Hey, we got North Sea Gas!! It's ours!!

I dunno how much I pay actually for gas, around 30 quid a month for a five bed, eight room house (which actually sounds grander than it is!!). I'll check the bill when I can be bothered....

Ste, watching Baltimore getting Nuked again on 'The Sum of Fears' on telly....

[wxman]

It will be intersting to see if the new pipeline will now be built or if Germany and other western european countries will think of other forms of fuel. Interesting that in Germany prior to this, many people had a favorable view of Putin, but now they are starting criticize the whole plan and do not want to face the same threats that Ukraine did. It doesn't help that former chancellor Schroeder was hired by Gazprom at $1 million a year, only a month after leaving office, and he brokered the deal between BASF and Gazprom. I think there will be a lot of problems with building the new pipeline. Putin knew what the Ukrainian reaction would be, but he was caught totally off guard by the EU reaction and especially the German reaction.

[andrewfi]

Wxman, I do not think that Gazpeom were caught off-guard by the European reaction. If that were the case, they would not have installed German Auditors at the pumping stations at the Ukraine Border. There is a lot of posturing going on, but in the end, just follow the money.

There will be no new energy source within four years. Natural gas will be the main power production fuel in Europe for the next generation. The Baltic pipline solves a load of problems for Russia and Europe, especially as it is designed to serve countries as distant as the UK.

As in most things, if youwant to understand what is happening, simply follow the money. People will say and do many things, for many reasons, but in the end the things that people mean are backed up with cold hard cash. In the end, that is also why the 'Orange Revolution' as inspired by US cash and influence fails, the US has no real way of sustaining it other than through rhetoric and Ukrainians have heard enough of that over the past century.

 

[Bruno]

There will be no new energy source within four years. Natural gas will be the main power production fuel in Europe for the next generation.

Certainly true when i see the situation in Belgium... 60% of our electricity is make with nuclear plant... but since some "ecologic" accords, in the next 15 year, all our nuclear plant will be stopped... Russian natural gaz is the only one solution for replace these nuclear plant...

[wxman]

I don't know how much truth is in this article, but it is interesting.

http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,393818,00.html

I have a few relatives in Germany and it seems the big stink is about former chancellor Schroeder working for Gazprom which truly takes it's orders from Putin. They just don't like the idea of their former chancellor taking orders from Putin, or really from anyone. Germany has finally stopped taking orders from the US, and now they feel they are taking orders from Russia.

[Oosik]

... In the end, that is also why the 'Orange Revolution' as inspired by US cash and influence fails, the US has no real way of sustaining it other than through rhetoric and Ukrainians have heard enough of that over the past century.

Proof Please.
Funny how whenever the US does something, it is never for altruistic purposes. I suppose if we had helped the Ukrainian people throw off a corrupt dictator, it would somehow diminish the benefit of it to the Ukrainian people, as we all know the US never does anything nice for anyone.

[jb]

Oosik,

While I tend to mostly disagree with Andrew on matters of politics, in  this case it's helpful to remember that nation-states do not have  friends, nation-states have interests.  As long as those interests  remain parallel everything is pretty cozy between nations, let things  get to cross purposes and it's called war.   In the case of  Ukraine, the US has no interest in who is top dog in an orange or  purple revolution, only in what might look good for American business  down the road.  The primary function of government is to grease  the wheels of business and trade.  Nothing more, nothing less.

[Oosik]

Not to mention that it is in our future military interest that the Ukraine be stable and friendly.

I would hope also that just as you and I would wish the best for the people of the FSU, that those in power sometimes let some thoughts like that influence their policy making.

[Leslie]

Here is the political fall out -

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-1979455,00.html

Does anyone know what Tymoshenko stans for ??