Russia After Putin: Inherent Leadership Struggles

[Muzh]

 Analysis   Editor's Note: This is the first part of a three-part series on Russia's leadership after President Vladimir Putin eventually leaves office. Part 1 revisits Putin's rise to power; Part 2 will examine Russia's demographics, energy sector and Putin's political changes; and Part 3 will explore whether the political systems Putin has built will survive him.
 
Russia has undergone a series of fundamental changes over the past year, with more changes on the horizon. Russia's economic model based on energy is being tested, the country's social and demographic make-up is shifting, and its political elites are aging. All this has led the Kremlin to begin asking how the country should be led once its unifying leader, Vladimir Putin, is gone. Already, a restructuring of the political elite is taking place, and hints of succession plans have emerged. Historically, Russia has been plagued by the dilemma of trying to create a succession plan following a strong and autocratic leader. The question now is whether Putin can set a system in place for his own passing out of the Russian leadership (whenever the time may be) without destabilizing the system as a whole.

 A Difficult Land to Rule Without a heavy-handed leader, Russia struggles to maintain stability. Instability is inherent to Russia given its massive, inhospitable territory, indefensible borders, hostile neighboring powers and diverse population. Only when it has had an autocratic leader who set up a system where competing factions are balanced against each other has Russia enjoyed prosperity and stability.

A system of balances under one resolute figure existed during the rule of some of the country's most prominent leaders, such as Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander II, Josef Stalin -- and now Vladimir Putin.

Each Russian leader must create and tinker with this system to ensure the governing apparatus does not atrophy, fracture or rise in mutiny. For this reason, Russian leaders have continually had to rearrange the power circles beneath them. Significant adjustments have been necessary as Russia grows and stabilizes or declines and comes under threat.

However, creating a power balance in the government with layers whose collective loyalty is ultimately to a single figure at the apex has created succession problems. When a clear succession plan is not in place, Russia tends to fall into chaos during leadership transitions -- sometimes even ripping itself apart. The so-called Time of Troubles, a brutal civil war in the 16th century, broke out after Ivan the Terrible killed his only competent son. During the Soviet period, a vicious succession struggle erupted upon Lenin's death in 1924, with Josef Stalin ultimately winning and his main challenger, Leon Trotsky, exiled and later assassinated. Following Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov and Lavrentiy Beria engaged in a similar power struggle.

In many of these cases, contenders for power represent a group or a clan of sorts vying for control. The individual represents a body that derives its power from its ties to security, military, industrial, financial or other circles. Stability is achieved only when there is one overarching leader in Russia capable of overseeing each of these groups' agendas and balancing them for the good of the country. Putin's transition into leadership and his subsequent 13 years in power serve as a prime example of such a balancing act.

 The Rise of Putin Putin came to power in 1999, when Russia had experienced almost a decade of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Russia was in a state of near-collapse. It had lost its Eastern and Central European satellites and the other constituent republics of the former Soviet Union, which had created a buffer from foreign powers around Russia. Fierce conflicts wracked the Russian republics in the northern Caucasus, some of which sought to break lose from Moscow's grip. Under then-President Boris Yeltsin, various foreign groups and a new class of business elites known as the oligarchs stripped Russia's major strategic sectors, including oil, natural gas, mining, telecoms and agriculture, leaving most of them in disarray.

The most important of those sectors, energy, was devastated. Between 1988 and 1996, oil production fell from 11.4 million barrels per day to 6 million barrels per day. Oil historically has provided one of Moscow's key sources of revenue, funding half the state budget for more than 60 years. With this revenue halved, the Yeltsin government was forced to slash military and social spending, further deepening the country's disarray. At the end of the 1990s, Russia plunged into a deep financial crisis that resulted in a default on domestic and foreign debts, food shortages, a sharp devaluation of the ruble and inflation above 84 percent.

Fierce political infighting erupted, and many of Yeltsin's top men and supporters, including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, distanced themselves from the weakening president. Moreover, Yeltsin lacked a succession plan.

At the time, Russia had two main political factions and a nominal third faction. The most powerful clan was the siloviki, which was loosely made up of national security hawks and former KGB agents. The siloviki were strong rivals to Yeltsin's own clan, known as the Family, which was made up of his relatives and a menagerie of other loyalists -- many of whom were beginning to dissent from Yeltsin because of Russia's political, social and economic chaos. The third group was a smaller, quieter clan known as the Petersburg Group given its origins in St. Petersburg under that city's powerful mayor, Anatoly Sobchak. The Petersburg clan was different in that it included a mixture of liberal (including some pro-Western) reformers, former KGB operatives and independents. Sobchak was able to bridge the differences within these groups in St. Petersburg.

In an attempt to undermine the siloviki to buy time to sort out his own clan's issues, Yeltsin allowed Vladimir Putin, a member of the Petersburg clan, to rise to power. Putin was at first brought in to oversee the Federal Security Service (known by its Russian acronym, FSB) in 1998, after which he quickly was named to succeed Yeltsin, whose followers continued to revolt. Yeltsin had not counted on the ability of Putin, who commanded loyalty from the Petersburg clan, the siloviki, and even some of Yeltsin's Family, to unify Russia.

Much like his mentor, Sobchak, Putin understood that the only way to stabilize Russia (let alone rebuild its previous strength) was to balance its competing forces against each other under his consolidated power, purging any who would not comply. Putin successfully garnered loyalty from Russia's two main competing ideological groups: Those who would put national security first, and those who would open up the country and reform it. Putin subscribed to both ideologies to some degree. As a former member of the KGB, he shared affinities with the siloviki. But he understood Russia's inherent weaknesses; during his time in the KGB, he was tasked with covertly securing technologies from the West, an experience that framed his appreciation for Russia's need to modernize to compete effectively with the West.

Putin placed the siloviki and the liberals, who eventually became known as civiliki, in positions that best suited his strategy for the country. Striking a political balance in the Kremlin allowed Putin to launch a series of massive consolidations across the country. As a result, he took direct control over Russia's strategic sectors, strengthened Russia's defenses, bolstered government revenues, stabilized the economic system, and clamped down on dissent, whether from the political opposition or from militants in the Muslim Caucasus.

By stabilizing Russia, Putin gained the support of most Russians, granting him political legitimacy during his first two terms as president. He eventually gained a cult-like status.

With this kind of popular support, Putin established one political party -- United Russia -- that dominated the government and both main clans. Military, economic, financial and energy assets were divided between the two groups. For example, the siloviki ran the military, FSB and oil sector, while the civiliki ran the country's economic and financial institutions and the natural gas sector. Each side's sectors guaranteed them financial resources and political tools. Such a balance kept the two competing clans relatively in check, though power struggles remained a constant. Eventually, Igor Sechin took over the siloviki while Vladislav Surkov and later Dmitri Medvedev took over the civiliki.
The balancing of the clan system has three major flaws. First, it is wholly dependent on Putin's subordinates to control their own subordinates, and so on, for the system to hold together. Putin therefore has been dependent upon Sechin, Surkov and Medvedev, who in turn have been dependent on their subordinates. One break in the chain can therefore have serious consequences. This absolute hierarchy begins to fray if one individual fails. There has been constant reshuffling at the lower levels while the hierarchy at the top has remained mostly the same until recently, even if their performance has been poor.

The second issue is that a vertically arranged system cannot handle change coming from outside the system. The vertical system finds it difficult to adapt to fundamental shifts in Russia or global events that affect Russia.

The third issue is that the hierarchal clan system heavily relies on the person at the apex. Putin, who has interests in both, is the ultimate arbiter among the clans. He once sought to step back from the presidency and allow the clans to try to continue under a new leadership. The year he left the presidency, 2008, saw Russia the strongest it had been in decades. It was enjoying the benefit of high oil prices, a strengthened military, a unified political system and a dominant energy position in Europe. Putin chose then-Gazprom Chairman Dmitri Medvedev to succeed him as president. Putin chose a civiliki because the siloviki are the stronger group and because Russia was flirting with the idea of opening up to foreign investment. Having a liberal reformer as president, the thinking went, could help rehabilitate Russia's reputation.

After Putin's departure, however, the cracks in the hierarchal system turned into gaping fissures in 2008-2009. Medvedev and the civiliki split over how to handle the global financial crisis, giving the siloviki a chance to grow in power. Putin ultimately had to step back in to restabilize the system, first behind the scenes in 2009 to make sweeping financial decisions and then publicly in 2012 as president. But by then, even more dangerous and larger fundamental shifts inside Russia started to emerge -- shifts that threatened not just the system Putin had built, but the country itself.
 

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-after-putin-inherent-leadership-struggles?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20130625&utm_term=FreeReport&utm_content=readmore&elq=b037461392714cb1babf9e29b35b987e

[Shadow]

Always funny how such pieces are written without actual inside knowledge of the situation in Russia.
The Medvedev-Putin tandem has been teting potential candidates for their ability and possibity to wnchant the masses. Some may call it political shifts or internal struggles.
Reality is that they know there is limited time to train the future leaders, and any new candidate they put forward is immediately going to be tested on stress and leadership. That leaves several ways of handling. One is to split up the party and let the new faces compete for a win, so they hold the possibility to return if the leadership is not up to par. Another one is to use the 'internal struggle' as testing ground, then carefully train and prepare the next generation for the moment they resign and push them forward.
Time will tell which method is chosen.

[mendeleyev]

The article makes some good points but as Shadow writes, there are pitfalls as well. In regards to splitting the (United Russia) party and testing new leaders, that has already begun with Mr. Putin's new Popular Front coalition party.

[OlgaH]

The article makes some good points but as Shadow writes, there are pitfalls as well. In regards to splitting the (United Russia) party and testing new leaders, that has already begun with Mr. Putin's new Popular Front coalition party.

Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that the members of the People's Front for Russia (Popular Front) have to share the tactical and strategical goals of the United Russia Party. Since the first days of the Putin's "People's Front for Russia" people and organizations have been forced to join the new coalition. The ultimatum has been always clear "you join or you lose your job". Russian journalist Andrey Kolesnikov compared the Putin's new coalition with the realization of Benito Mussolini's program - "Corporation of Mussolini"

"Народный фронт Путина и есть корпорация Муссолини: все, от профсоюзов Шмакова до женских организаций, получают единую крышу. Главное – оставаться под крышей, под  контролем, не рыпаться и вовремя произносить здравицы."

"Putin's People's Front for Russia is the corporation of Mussolini: all, from Shmakov's Trade Unions to women organizations get one roof. The most important to stay under the roof, under control, toast (to "boss" health) timely and  not to contradict"

http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/5918.html


Members of the Union of Russian Composers published the open letter protesting against forcible joining the Putin's People's Front for Russia. The members expressed their indignation when they got to know they become members of the Putin's coalition without their knowledge and against their will.

The Union of Russian Composers was not only organization protesting against the Putin's People's Front for Russia. The Unions of architects, writers, artists and others expressed their protests as well.

http://lenta.ru/news/2011/06/29/narfront/

[mendeleyev]

There is one person that Vladimir seems to fear more than others and for some time there have been rumblings that he will face a new round of charges to make sure he remains in prison for awhile longer.

Today the Moscow Times confirmed that new charges will be forthcoming and to prepare the public for a new round of trials, the state controlled NTV channel has aired a documentary alleging that the Yukos founders, including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, were involved in the killing of the mayor of Nefteyugansk in western Siberia in 1998. The film is seen by experts as part of a campaign to set the scene for a third criminal case against Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev.

The documentary, called "Murder for a Present," was shown on NTV at 11:35 p.m. Monday and focused on the murder of Vladimir Petukhov, who was gunned down in the city on Khodorkovsky's birthday in 1998. The documentary's release also coincides with Khodorkovsky's birthday, June 26.

Senior Yukos official Alexei Pichugin was accused of plotting the murder of the popular mayor, who resisted Yukos' harsh capitalist practices, for example, by getting rid of social infrastructure in the city. "No one ever doubted that Yukos should be blamed for ordering it," the narrator of the documentary said.

Pichugin was sentenced to life in prison in 2007. Investigators said earlier that the murder was organized by Yukos co-founder Leonid Nevzlin, who left Russia and now lives in Israel.

Read more: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ntv-yukos-film-fuels-campaign-against-khodorkovsky/482236.html#ixzz2XIO1KKAx

[Gator]

The term after in "Russia after Putin"  seems like a impossibility.  Russia and Putin are indivisible other than by an Act of God. 
 
Putin will die some day as did Mayor Daley, yet Chicago remained the same. 

[Muzh]

There is one person that Vladimir seems to fear more than others and for some time there have been rumblings that he will face a new round of charges to make sure he remains in prison for awhile longer.

Today the Moscow Times confirmed that new charges will be forthcoming and to prepare the public for a new round of trials, the state controlled NTV channel has aired a documentary alleging that the Yukos founders, including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, were involved in the killing of the mayor of Nefteyugansk in western Siberia in 1998. The film is seen by experts as part of a campaign to set the scene for a third criminal case against Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev.

The documentary, called "Murder for a Present," was shown on NTV at 11:35 p.m. Monday and focused on the murder of Vladimir Petukhov, who was gunned down in the city on Khodorkovsky's birthday in 1998. The documentary's release also coincides with Khodorkovsky's birthday, June 26.

Senior Yukos official Alexei Pichugin was accused of plotting the murder of the popular mayor, who resisted Yukos' harsh capitalist practices, for example, by getting rid of social infrastructure in the city. "No one ever doubted that Yukos should be blamed for ordering it," the narrator of the documentary said.

Pichugin was sentenced to life in prison in 2007. Investigators said earlier that the murder was organized by Yukos co-founder Leonid Nevzlin, who left Russia and now lives in Israel.

Read more: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ntv-yukos-film-fuels-campaign-against-khodorkovsky/482236.html#ixzz2XIO1KKAx

Wow, the same dose Yanukonvict gave to Goldilocks with the mayor of Donetsk.

When are these Soviet relics going to die?

[mendeleyev]

When are these Soviet relics going to die?

Sadly it does seem that it will take a generation or two and there is no guarantee even then that true democracy stands a long term chance. The real question is when will the people want to change? The Internet is the great leveling influence of our age. Only in places like North Korea where there is no access online can a dictator survive unless the people are afraid of change. The status quo keeps many a ruler in power for years.

Belarus is a good example of how most citizens can exist almost at the poverty level, yet the majority be so used to it and the few benefits it offers that they are afraid to change. It will take a generation of older citizens in both Russia and Belarus to pass before new ideas can fully thrive.

[Boethius]

Wow, the same dose Yanukonvict gave to Goldilocks with the mayor of Donetsk.

When are these Soviet relics going to die?

Ah, but there is independent evidence that Tymoshenko was involved in the murder of Shcherban, some of it coming from the U.S. after Lazarenko's arrest there.  So, I don't think we can blame Yanukovich for this.

From the other side, we should be asking why Tymoshenko and Khodorkovsky sought political power/influence.

[Muzh]

Ah, but there is independent evidence that Tymoshenko was involved in the murder of Shcherban, some of it coming from the U.S. after Lazarenko's arrest there.  So, I don't think we can blame Yanukovich for this.

From the other side, we should be asking why Tymoshenko and Khodorkovsky sought political power/influence.

Boe, that don't absolve anyone of the relics. 

ALL of them are thieves as far as I'm concerned and should go the way of Mussolini. 

[Boethius]

HAHA.  Yes, it's time to call the Germans in.

[mendeleyev]

If Yanukonvict gave even a small percentage of time to prosecuting the murders and various crimes of his pal, "who's yo Daddy" Kuchma, I'm be more inclined to think the current crusade on Yulia had moral legitimacy. Odd that a greater criminal walks so that the lady who signed a legit gas contract with Putin can be chased to hell and back.

[OlgaH]

Sadly it does seem that it will take a generation or two and there is no guarantee even then that true democracy stands a long term chance. The real question is when will the people want to change? The Internet is the great leveling influence of our age. Only in places like North Korea where there is no access online can a dictator survive unless the people are afraid of change. The status quo keeps many a ruler in power for years.

Belarus is a good example of how most citizens can exist almost at the poverty level, yet the majority be so used to it and the few benefits it offers that they are afraid to change. It will take a generation of older citizens in both Russia and Belarus to pass before new ideas can fully thrive.

I agree, Mendeleyev. The general mentality was formed during the centuries. Putin who built his power on the same principles that any other dictator did is a product of the general mentality and he remains in power due to the same general mentality.

But new generation of free thinkers is growing up notwithstanding the state controlled education with the Orthodox Church in public schools preaching "any power is given by God." How many generation it will take, I don't know, but most likely as you said "It will take a generation of older citizens in both Russia and Belarus to pass before new ideas can fully thrive" and one of the Pushkin's poems will be imprinted on the hearts and minds.

"Forth went the sower to sow his seeds..."   As freedom's sower in the wasteland Before the morning star I went; From hand immaculate and chastened Into the grooves of prisonment Flinging the vital seed I wandered-- But it was time and toiling squandered, Benevolent designs misspent...   Graze on, graze on, submissive nation! You will not wake to honor's call. Why offer herds their liberation? For them are shears or slaughter-stall, Their heritage each generation The yoke with jingles, and the gall. Nov. 1923

Изыде сеятель сеяти семена своя Свободы сеятель пустынный, Я вышел рано, до звезды; Рукою чистой и безвинной В порабощенные бразды Бросал живительное семя — Но потерял я только время, Благие мысли и труды... Паситесь, мирные народы! Вас не разбудит чести клич. К чему стадам дары свободы? Их должно резать или стричь. Наследство их из рода в роды Ярмо с гремушками да бич. Ноябрь 1823

[Boethius]

If Yanukonvict gave even a small percentage of time to prosecuting the murders and various crimes of his pal, "who's yo Daddy" Kuchma, I'm be more inclined to think the current crusade on Yulia had moral legitimacy. Odd that a greater criminal walks so that the lady who signed a legit gas contract with Putin can be chased to hell and back.

A legitimate contract?  It was signed contrary to Ukrainian law, increased the price of gas Ukraine paid eightfold, and Tymoshenko's personal debt to Russia of $465 million dollars "disappeared" once that contract was signed.  Coincidental?

Tymoshenko denied she had any assets or cash.  She claimed all she had was a two bedroom apartment in Dnepropetrovsk, and she paid taxes on this alleged income.  Yet her VISA bill for an eight month period was $1 million.  How did she pay this on her paltry declared income and assets?  On that basis alone, she'd be under investigation in any Western democracy and in many, facing jail time.  She would have never managed to make it to the PM's office in my country, based solely on her past as a purveyor to minors of pirated porn.

There is indirect evidence of Kuchma's involvement in Gongadze's murder and yes, he will get away with it.  However, there is direct evidence of Tymoshenko's involvement in Shcherban's murder.  That evil ***** deserves worse than jail for all the damage she's done to Ukraine, and for all she's stolen from the Ukrainian people.

[mendeleyev]

Bo, when it comes to Kuchma murders, whether direct or indirect, few prosecutors have the time to type them all.

No, it didn't raise prices by eight fold. Yulia's gas deal was legal. You may not like it, but it was and still is a legally binding contract. It for the first time allows Ukraine to buy LESS gas if needed without penalty, and starting in 2010 raised transit fees paid by Russia by 60%!

The only thing the convict in power didn't like was that it cut out two of his cronies/supporters who had been "middlemen" in previous gas deals.

[Boethius]

Remember that at the time Tymoshenko negotiated this "great" contract, Ukraine had a locked in contract at $50  per thousand cubic meters.  Yushchenko and his clique were siphoning Russian gas and selling it to Europe, so Yushchenko went to Russia to renegotiate the contract.  The intent was to start a gas war, so that Ukraine could shut down its pipeline to Europe, and the politicians who had siphoned Russian gas and diverted it for their own purposes could sell it to the EU at ten times higher than what Ukraine was paying.  Tymoshenko was not part of this scheme.

Tymoshenko did not have the legal authority to bind Naftogaz to a contract with Russia.  This is something that had to be ratified by Ukraine's Council of Ministers.  Tymoshenko assured Dubyna that the Council of Ministers had consented to the contract, and presented Dubyna with a document, with the forged signatures of each of the ministers.  This is all taped, so it is not exactly secret.  That was illegal.  The Council of Ministers, which under Ukrainian law, had to approve the deal, had no clue about it.  Based on that forgery, Dubyna signed the contract with Russia, binding Naftogaz to the renegotiated contract.  When Dubyna later learned of the forged document presented to him by Tymoshenko, he had a heart attack.

Immediately before Tymoshenko's deal, Gazprom had offered to sell Ukraine gas at $250 per thousand cubic meters.  The contract Tymoshenko negotiated was at $450 per tcm, with a  first year discount to $230 per tcm.  Ukraine was also getting half of what it should for gas transit under the new deal, at a price 10% higher than what Germany was paying for Russian gas,  By early 2010, the price had skyrocketed to $400 per tcm even after Yanukovich had renegotiated a $100 per tcm discount.  So, Ukraine not only went from paying $50 tcm to $230 tcm under a discount in year 1, it also ended up paying higher than world prices subsequently. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko's personal debt of $465 million to Russia, based on a previous illegal contract which Russian authorities said they would pursue against her, personally, disappeared.  Finally, she also bound Ukraine to providing long term access to the Black Sea to Russia, something which, at the time, was very controversial politically.

[mendeleyev]

If we were to imprison all the serious criminals in Russia and Ukraine, no leaders would be left standing. That is why the charges in Ukraine against Yulia and in Russia against Mikhail are politically motivated. They may not the innocent as lambs but with foxes guarding the hen houses, the reason they have been jailed is not for the crimes they may have committed, but for removing them from political competition.

They are thus political prisoners.

[Boethius]

Tymoshenko is not the only one jailed in Ukraine on corruption charges.  There have been many charged and put on trial, and many more are in hiding.  My husband has a relative, through marriage, who is in hiding, he fled when the arrest warrant was issued.  He is not a politician,  and yes, he should be in jail.

[OlgaH]

If we were to imprison all the serious criminals in Russia and Ukraine, no leaders would be left standing. That is why the charges in Ukraine against Yulia and in Russia against Mikhail are politically motivated. They may not the innocent as lambs but with foxes guarding the hen houses, the reason they have been jailed is not for the crimes they may have committed, but for removing them from political competition.

They are thus political prisoners.

Right to the point, Mendeleyev. All these processes of justice are show trials, that what happens when you do not comply with the "Godfather's" rules and have the insolence to criticize him more over publicly.

[Ranetka]

If we were to imprison all the serious criminals in Russia and Ukraine, no leaders would be left standing. That is why the charges in Ukraine against Yulia and in Russia against Mikhail are politically motivated. They may not the innocent as lambs but with foxes guarding the hen houses, the reason they have been jailed is not for the crimes they may have committed, but for removing them from political competition.

They are thus political prisoners.

So are you saying criminals should be let out of jail because other criminals are free?
If you accept they have committed crimes for which they are imprisoned why is "the real" reason important?


To me it's a bit like breaching high way code. In a way.     Imagine a black guy moaning that he was stopped not because he was speeding but because his skin colour. What's your answer to him? Mine - do not speed....

[Ranetka]

So are you saying criminals should be let out of jail because other criminals are free?
If you accept they have committed crimes for which they are imprisoned why is "the real" reason important?


To me it's a bit like breaching high way code. In a way.     Imagine a black guy moaning that he was stopped not because he was speeding but because of his skin colour. What's your answer to him? Mine - do not speed....

Вор должен сидеть в тюрьме. Do you know this quote Mendy?

[Boethius]

Right to the point, Mendeleyev. All these processes of justice are show trials, that what happens when you do not comply with the "Godfather's" rules and have the insolence to criticize him more over publicly.

It's not really a show trial if the criminal is guilty.  That certainly is the case with Tymoshenko.

[Muzh]

Tymoshenko is not the only one jailed in Ukraine on corruption charges.  There have been many charged and put on trial, and many more are in hiding. My husband has a relative, through marriage, who is in hiding, he fled when the arrest warrant was issued.  He is not a politician,  and yes, he should be in jail.

Ah yes indeed. They just happen to be from the Goldilocks block.

I know, I know. There is a token Party of Thieves in jail, BUT that was because he was so blatant and was in your face to Yanukonvict.

[Muzh]

It's not really a show trial if the criminal is guilty.  That certainly is the case with Tymoshenko.

Oh boy.

We will have to disagree on this one.

If they would have gone to another court, not the one which is known throughout the country as the most bribable...

[Boethius]

Not all those convicted in Ukraine come from the Tymoshenko bloc but yes, I agree, they are almost all largely rivals. 


Note, the issue with Tymoshenko was not her decades long theft of state property.  It was for abuse of office.  That she profited from actions personally was a sidebar.  What she did damaged the Ukrainian economy, and its people, significantly.